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Head to Head: The NFL Concussion Scandal and 
an Argument for OSHA Regulation 
Kirstie Brenson† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the National Football League (NFL) has ensnared 
itself in scandal. At the center of the controversy is the concern that 
teams often allow, or even require, players to return to the field too 
quickly after suffering a concussion or head trauma. Intertwined with 
this is a competing concern: how should NFL teams care for current and 
former players suffering from concussion-related injuries sustained 
during their time playing for the NFL?1 The NFL has taken some steps 
to change its rules in an attempt to prevent concussions from happening 
in the first place. While these measures seem to be somewhat effective 
in reducing the rate of concussion,2 as of 2015, NFL players were still 
suffering an average of 0.43 concussions per game, and the number of 
reported concussions suffered in the 2016–17 season was on par with 
the average number of reported concussions suffered in the past four 
seasons.3 
Concerns regarding concussions suffered on the field and post-con-
cussion treatment were recently raised in a class action lawsuit brought 
on behalf of retired professional football players.4 The suit, which set-
tled in April 2015, alleged claims of negligence and fraud and sought 
 
 † A.B. 2012, The College of William & Mary; J.D. Candidate 2018, The University of Chicago 
Law School.  My thanks and gratitude go to Professor John Rappaport for his thoughtful sugges-
tions and guidance, and to the past and present staff and board of The University of Chicago Legal 
Forum. 
 1 Bryan Lipsky, Note, Dealing with the NFL’s Concussion Problems of Yesterday, Today, and 
Tomorrow, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 959 (2008). 
 2 See Jon Hyman, OSHA and Pro Sports—Are Concussions the NFL’s Black Lung?, 
LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM LAB. & EMPL. L. BLOG (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.lexisnexis.com/ 
legalnewsroom/labor-employment/b/labor-employment-top-blogs/archive/2015/03/18/osha-and-pro 
-sports-are-concussions-the-nfl-s-black-lung.aspx [https://perma.cc/SL6J-5U5R] (noting that the 
rate of concussion fell twenty-five percent from the 2013 season to the 2014 season). 
 3 Seth Walder, NFL Releases Its Concussion Data—How This Season Compares to Past Ones, 
NY DAILY NEWS (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/nfl-releases-concus 
sion-data-compares-seasons-article-1.2956490 [https://perma.cc/2CZB-V88S]. 
 4 See In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig. (NFL Concussion Litig.), 
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declaratory relief, medical monitoring, and damages.5 The settlement 
resulted in monetary relief for members of the class, the establishment 
of a baseline assessment program to test for cognitive decline, and the 
creation of an education fund to promote safety and injury prevention 
“for football players of all ages.”6 In tandem with pressure from the pub-
lic, the litigation also prompted the adoption of a set of basic safety prin-
ciples known as the “NFL Game Day Concussion Protocol.”7 These 
safety principles revised the protocol for post-injury care in the event of 
an on-field concussion.8 Even so, these forms of relief fail to provide a 
solution to the underlying problem—a game and its rules that allow for 
and perhaps even promote injury-inducing play. 
In light of the class action litigation and subsequent settlement, 
existing scholarship largely focuses on litigation strategy, affirmative 
defenses, and medical malpractice litigation. One line of analysis is con-
spicuously absent from discussion of the potential legal implications of 
the concussion scandal—occupational safety. The Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) was founded with the purpose of 
protecting employees from the dangers of hazardous workplaces.9 This 
begs the question: what has OSHA done to ensure a workplace environ-
ment free from hazards for professional football players? This Comment 
will explore the possibility of OSHA regulation of professional football 
through analysis of statutory language and administrative opinions. 
First, this Comment will present background information on the 
structure of the NFL and shed light on the history and context of its 
concussion scandal. This discussion will illuminate the health concerns 
inherent in football-related head trauma, thus providing justification 
for OSHA intervention. Next, the Comment will discuss OSHA, both in 
terms of its legislative purpose and its statutory authority. It will then 
consider whether OSHA’s jurisdiction reaches professional football. For 
OSHA to properly assert jurisdiction over NFL teams, there must be an 
employment relationship between NFL players and their teams, and 
OSHA must be able to show a violation of one of its clauses. As there is 
not a specific clause that concerns professional sports in the relevant 
legislation, OSHA must point to a violation of its general duty clause, 
 
307 F.R.D. 351, 361–62 (E.D. Penn. 2015). 
 5 Id. at 362. 
 6 Id. at 366–69. 
 7 Id.; see also Paul D. Anderson, NFL to Enforce Concussion Protocol Violations, NFL 
CONCUSSION LITIG. (July 26, 2016), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1900 [https://perma.cc/ 
L26J-PQ2K]. 
 8 Id. 
 9 About OSHA, OSHA., https://www.osha.gov/about.html [https://perma.cc/M95D-QGDL]. 
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which acts as a catch-all. Finally, after demonstrating OSHA’s jurisdic-
tion over professional football, the Comment will argue that OSHA can 
and should regulate professional football as an industry. 
II. PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL 
The NFL was founded in 1920 as the American Professional Foot-
ball Conference.10 The unifying goal was to create a league of football 
teams in which all members followed the same rules.11 Creation of the 
league was a reaction to three problems: “dramatically rising salaries; 
players continually jumping from one team to another following the 
highest offer; and the use of college players still enrolled in school.”12 
The league changed its name to the American Professional Football As-
sociation in late 1920, and then to the National Football League on June 
24, 1922.13 
This section begins by describing the history and structure of the 
NFL, with brief discussion of various league policies. Each of these 
league policies or governing documents have the potential to contribute 
to a solution to the NFL’s concussion problem, but none sufficiently ad-
dress the problem. This section then provides background information 
on the NFL’s concussion scandal that illuminates the NFL’s controver-
sial stances on football-related head trauma over the years and illus-
trates the need for a stronger solution. This discussion incorporates in-
formation about litigation brought against the NFL as a result of 
football-related head trauma, as well as current league policies that 
purport to ameliorate the concussion problem. 
A. The Structure of the NFL 
To understand OSHA’s potential to regulate NFL teams, it is first 
necessary to understand the league’s structure. The NFL is a trade as-
sociation comprised of 32 teams.14 The Constitution and Bylaws of the 
 
 10 NFL, OFFICIAL 2016 NFL RECORD & FACT BOOK, 97TH SEASON 355–56 (2016), http://www. 
nfl.com/static/content/public/photo/2015/07/21/0ap3000000502939.pdf#page=357 [https://perma. 
cc/9EMN-KSVM]. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 356. 
 14 Patrick Doyle, Why is the NFL a Nonprofit?, PUBLICSOURCE, Oct. 13, 2014, http://www.witf. 
org/news/2014/10/why-is-the-nfl-a-nonprofit.php [https://perma.cc/H3QN-M3JW]. The NFL has 
renounced its 501(c)(6) tax-exempt status; this renunciation does not have any bearing on the 
structure of the NFL for the purposes of this Comment. See Joe Pinsker, Why the NFL Decided to 
Start Paying Taxes, ATLANTIC (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/ 
04/why-the-nfl-decided-to-start-paying-taxes/391742/ [https://perma.cc/2ERM-64LF]. 
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National Football League (“NFL Constitution”) governs the relation-
ship between the NFL and its member teams; this document grants 
rights and assigns responsibilities to the teams.15 
Players are drafted directly by individual teams and sign a stand-
ard contract with the NFL that includes a rider for the specific team.16 
Among other things, player contracts include clauses stating that the 
parties to the contract agree to be bound to the terms of the NFL Con-
stitution.17 The NFL Constitution is ambiguous in its treatment of the 
employment status of players; at one point, the document refers to play-
ers as employees of teams, but elsewhere in the document players and 
employees are differentiated in treatment.18 An employment relation-
ship is a prerequisite to OSHA jurisdiction, as discussed in greater de-
tail below. Accordingly, the NFL Constitution’s ambiguous references 
to the employment status of NFL players illuminate a controversy cen-
tral to this argument: are NFL players employees of the teams for which 
they play? 
There is very little within the NFL Constitution that concerns 
safety and injury protocol. The document requires home teams to pro-
vide a physician and ambulance at each game for the use of both teams, 
and the NFL Catastrophic Loss Program provides league-wide coverage 
for all NFL players at all times for on-field and off-field injuries.19 The 
Catastrophic Loss Program focuses on injuries not associated with con-
cussions, as the relevant bylaw specifically mentions paraplegia, quad-
riplegia, hemiplegia, monoplegia, total severance of limbs, and total loss 
of sight.20 Beyond this, there is little to no mention of safety or injury 
concerns, which indicates that the NFL neither pays sufficient atten-
tion to the safety concerns presented by head trauma nor provides suf-
ficient protections for NFL players. 
NFL players are members of the National Football League Players 
Association (NFLPA), and so players’ relationships with their member 
teams and the NFL itself are governed by the Collective Bargaining 
 
 15 NFL, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE (2006), http://www. 
nfl.com/static/content/public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4TU-PDPR]. 
 16 See, e.g., NFL Player Contract Between Arian Foster and Houston NFL Holdings, U.S. SEC. 
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1573683/0001 
04746913009713/a2216998zex-10_3.htm [https://perma.cc/W475-3AJC] [hereinafter NFL Player 
Contract]; see also NFL, NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 256 
(Aug. 4, 2011), https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011 
-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GB5-W3QK] [hereinafter COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT]. 
 17 NFL, supra note 15, at 11. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 98, 2002–10. 
 20 Id. at 2002–11. 
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Agreement (CBA).21 The current CBA is effective from August 4, 2011 
until the last day of the 2020 league year.22 The CBA is a fairly compre-
hensive document, but includes surprisingly few provisions related to 
on-field injuries. Of the relevant provisions, the CBA provides for an 
injury grievance system, workers’ compensation policies, and disability 
plans for former players—including neuro-cognitive disability bene-
fits—but does not mention injury prevention.23 Also of note is the fact 
that while team physicians are paid by the member team, their primary 
duty is to the player-patient—this may suggest the existence of per-
verse incentives.24 
B. Concussion Scandal 
At the heart of this Comment is the NFL’s concussion scandal. Over 
the past few decades, and especially in recent years, football-related 
head trauma has become increasingly prevalent. Reports of medical 
conditions from former players, coupled with increased information 
about the long-term effects of repeated concussions, have changed the 
way that many look at the NFL. This section describes the history of 
the concussion scandal, as well as recent litigation and current league 
policies, to provide context for the argument that follows. 
1. History of the scandal 
In January 1994, during the 1993 season NFC Championship 
game, Dallas Cowboys quarterback Troy Aikman suffered a concussion 
when another player’s knee made contact with his head.25 He was hos-
pitalized that night as a result of the injury.26 Later that year, Chicago 
Bears fullback Merrill Hoge decided to retire from professional foot-
ball.27 Hoge had suffered several concussions during his career and just 
two weeks earlier had taken a knee to the head that left him temporar-
ily unable to recognize his wife or brother.28 
 
 21 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 16, at xiv. For more information on the 
NFLPA, see NFLPA, https://www.nflpa.com [https://perma.cc/84YV-VWB2]. 
 22 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 16, at 253. 
 23 Id. at 176, 193, 237, 247. 
 24 Id. at 171. 
 25 Lauren Ezell, Timeline: The NFL’s Concussion Crisis, PBS FRONTLINE (Oct. 8, 2013), http:// 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sports/league-of-denial/timeline-the-nfls-concussion-crisis/ [ht 
tps://perma.cc/KM46-8WWE]. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
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In response to these instances of head trauma suffered by high-
profile players, the NFL created the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury 
(MTBI) Committee. The NFL Commissioner appointed Dr. Elliot 
Pellman as Chair of the Committee, despite his lack of experience in the 
field of brain injury.29 In December 1995, Dr. Pellman said in an inter-
view with Sports Illustrated that, “Concussions are part of the profes-
sion, an occupational risk,” and “[v]eterans clear more quickly than 
rookies. . . . They can unscramble their brains a little faster.”30 The 
MTBI Committee was and remains highly controversial; for years, it 
published findings in direct contradiction to those of other organiza-
tions, such as the NCAA, the Second International Conference on Con-
cussion in Sport, and the American Academy of Neurology.31 
In the following years, additional players made public their con-
cerns about concussions suffered during their time at the NFL. 
Throughout this time, the science and medical information regarding 
the short and long-term effects of concussion and head trauma devel-
oped. One source of this information was the American Academy of 
Neurology, which published its findings that “[r]epeated concussions 
can cause cumulative brain injury in an individual over months or 
years.”32 
The NFL suffered a blow in October 1999 when, for the first time, 
the NFL Retirement Board ruled that head injuries a former player suf-
fered while playing had rendered him disabled.33 The board’s ruling was 
not made public until reporters later uncovered it; the ruling and cover-
up suggest that “the league should’ve known there was a link between 
football and brain damage” as early as 1999.34 The revelation of the rul-
ing cast the NFL in a particularly bad light, as it demonstrated that the 
NFL Retirement Board had “awarded disability payments to at least 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Michael Farber, The Worst Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 19, 1994), http://www.si.com/ 
vault/1994/12/19/132920/the-worst-case-doctors-warn-that-repeated-concussions-can-lead-to-per 
manent-brain-dysfunction [https://perma.cc/CJF4-RSV4]. 
 31 Peter Keating, Doctor Yes, ESPN MAGAZINE (Nov. 6, 2006), http://www.espn.com/espnmag/ 
story?id=3644940 [https://perma.cc/Z8JH-9K6F]. Most relevant here is the MTBI Committee’s of-
ficial finding that returning to play after a concussion “does not involve significant risk of a second 
injury either in the same game or during the season.” At the time, several organizations, including 
those listed above, had published their own studies indicating the opposite. Id. 
 32 Ezell, supra note 25. In tandem with its findings, the American Academy of Neurology cir-
culated guidelines for sports players returning to play after a concussion. The NFL rejected these 
guidelines, claiming, “[w]e see people all the time that get knocked out briefly and have no symp-
toms.” See Barry Petchesky, A Timeline of Concussion Science and NFL Denial, DEADSPIN (Aug. 
30, 2013), http://deadspin.com/a-timeline-of-concussion-science-and-nfl-denial-1222395754 [http 
s://perma.cc/NT4A-7CT3]. 
 33 Ezell, supra note 25. 
 34 Id. 
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three former players after concluding that football caused their crip-
pling brain injuries—even as the league’s top medical experts for years 
consistently denied any link between the sport and long-term brain 
damage.”35 Despite the evidence to the contrary, Dr. Pellman’s response 
was to dismiss the issue by claiming that the great majority of concus-
sions resulted in only mild injury.36 
In 2007, Dr. Pellman stepped down from his position as Chair of 
the MTBI Committee; his resignation came on the heels of increasing 
information about the long-term effects of repeated head trauma.37 In 
2002, a doctor examined the brain of a deceased NFL player and discov-
ered the first evidence of the brain disease Chronic Traumatic Enceph-
alopathy (CTE).38 Doctors confirmed CTE was present in other deceased 
players, including some known to have suffered from dementia or de-
pression, or to have committed suicide.39 Dr. Pellman’s replacement, 
MTBI Chair Dr. Ira Casson, did little to remedy the situation and ada-
mantly denied “any evidence of a link between head injuries in NFL 
players and depression, dementia, or any other long-term problems re-
sulting in brain damage.”40 
Even so, Commissioner Roger Goodell, appointed in 2006,41 and the 
NFL began to take concerns regarding concussions and CTE more seri-
ously. In June 2007, the NFL hosted a “Concussion Summit” and in-
vited outside researchers to present on the dangers of concussions and 
head trauma. Later that year, the NFL issued a pamphlet on concus-
sions that claimed existing research regarding the long-term effects of 
concussions was inconclusive.42 The NFL admitted the link between 
concussions and long-term problems for the first time in December 
 
 35 Steve Fainaru, NFL Board Paid $2M to Players While League Denied Football-Concussion 
Link, PBS FRONTLINE (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/nfl-board-paid-
2m-to-players-while-league-denied-football-concussion-link/ [https://perma.cc/H52C-H2MG]. Even 
now, there is not much publicly available information regarding the Retirement Board’s decision 
to award disability benefits to those who had suffered head trauma on the field, and many players 
and their lawyers “were under the impression that the board did not approve any claims for chronic 
brain injuries related to football.” Id. 
 36 Don Pierson, Heads Up!, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 24, 1999), http://articles.chicagotrib 
une.com/1999-12-24/sports/9912240088_1_concussion-dr-elliott-pellman-helmets [https://perma. 
cc/9642-NHTD]. 
 37 Ezell, supra note 25. 
 38 Id.; see also Michael Kirk, Dr. Bennett Omalu, PBS FRONTLINE (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www. 
pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sports/league-of-denial/the-frontline-interview-dr-bennet-omalu/ [ht 
tps://perma.cc/SUU7-QL3B]. 
 39 Ezell, supra note 25. 
 40 Id. 
 41 NFL Owners Elect Goodell as New Commissioner, ESPN (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.espn. 
com/nfl/news/story?id=2543783 [https://perma.cc/T9WU-V99U]. 
 42 Ezell, supra note 25. 
23 BRENSON PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/17  12:17 PM 
602  THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2017 
 
2009.43 At that time, it also announced the institution of stricter return-
to-play policies, aimed at mitigating the damage caused by concus-
sions.44 
2. Litigation and settlement agreements 
In August 2011, former Atlanta Falcons safety Ray Easterling filed 
a lawsuit against the NFL.45 Among other things, the suit claimed that 
“the NFL Parties allegedly breached a duty to NFL Football players to 
warn and protect them from the long-term health problems associated 
with concussions and that the NFL Parties allegedly concealed and mis-
represented the connection between concussions and long-term chronic 
brain injury.”46 Over the course of the next two years, a total of 242 
lawsuits brought by and on behalf of current and former NFL players 
were filed against the NFL.47 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation consolidated the lawsuits into a multidistrict litigation in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania;48 a class action of over 4,500 former 
players was formed.49 
The lawsuit settled prior to trial.50 The Amended Settlement Agree-
ment required the NFL to pay monetary damages to class members and 
to establish an education fund to “promot[e] safety and injury preven-
tion with respect to football players, including safety-related initiatives 
in youth football, the education of Retired NFL Football Players regard-
ing the NFL CBA Medical and Disability Benefits programs, and other 
educational initiatives benefitting Retired NFL Football Players.”51 
Also included in the Settlement Agreement was the NFL’s denial of 
wrongdoing; the NFL “expressly den[ied] that they . . . have violated 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id.; see also Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint at 1–7, NFL 
Concussion Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Penn. 2015) (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB). 
 46 Class Action Settlement Agreement (As Amended) at 1, NFL Concussion Litig., 307 F.R.D. 
351 (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB). 
 47 See Court Documents, NFL CONCUSSION LITIGATION, http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/? 
page_id=18 [https://perma.cc/R2FM-WXT3] (listing lawsuits filed and consolidated in the MDL). 
 48 Ezell, supra note 25; Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint, 
supra note 45. 
 49 Few other lawsuits have been brought by or on behalf of NFL players in regards to the 
concussion scandal; of these suits, some are wrongful death and personal injury lawsuits, and some 
have been brought against the NFL Players Association or individual teams rather than against 
the NFL. These cases have either been dismissed or settled. See, e.g., Stipulation for Dismissal 
with Prejudice as to Roy Green’s Claims, Green v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club, No. 1422-
CC00005-01 (Cir. Ct. City of St. Louis Nov. 24, 2015); Ballard v. NFL Players Ass’n, 123 F.Supp.3d 
1161 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (dismissing claims). 
 50 NFL Concussion Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 361. 
 51 Class Action Settlement Agreement, supra note 46, at 63. 
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any duty to, breached any obligation to, committed any fraud on, or oth-
erwise engaged in any wrongdoing with respect to, the Class.”52 Many 
commentators have voiced opinions that the settlement is inadequate; 
critics claim insufficiency in at least two respects: (1) the amount of 
money set aside to compensate class members, and (2) the fact that the 
NFL is only required to compensate past sufferers of CTE with no plans 
to address future victims of CTE.53 
3. Current league policies 
As the result of litigation and mounting public pressure, the NFL 
implemented various safety protocols aimed at reducing risk of head 
trauma to players.54 These protocols range from a requirement that an 
independent medical professional be present on game day to educa-
tional initiatives meant to teach players about the risks associated with 
head trauma and advise safer ways to play the game.55 The protocols 
also make recommendations as to the safest helmets to wear, although 
choice of helmet is ultimately left to the player.56 
Of particular note is the NFL Sideline Concussion Assessment, a 
protocol to be followed in case of potential head trauma as a result of 
play.57 It is designed for use at first sign of a concussion and requires 
serial testing for the purpose of tracking recovery.58 Individual clubs 
keep the results of the assessment and also distribute results to the 
player and the team medical staff.59 The protocol provides for proper 
emergency care following game-day injury and enumerates standards 
 
 52 Id. at 86. 
 53 See, e.g., Thomas Barrabi, NFL Concussion Lawsuit Settlement: What ‘Frontline’ CTE Data 
Means for the Appeal Process, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/nfl-con 
cussion-lawsuit-settlement-what-frontline-cte-data-means-appeal-process-2104528 [https://perm 
a.cc/2HZQ-EZCR]; Blake Yagman, NFL Concussion Settlement Draws Supreme Court Petition, 
WITH THE FIRST PICK (Sept. 29, 2016), http://withthefirstpick.com/2016/09/29/nfl-concussion-set 
tlement-draws-supreme-court-petition/ [https://perma.cc/G836-SA62]. 
 54 See generally NFL PLAY SMART PLAY SAFE, https://www.playsmartplaysafe.com/ [https://per 
ma.cc/37XW-F4UL]. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Sam Borden, Despite Risks, N.F.L. Leaves Helmet Choices in Players’ Hands, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/sports/football/despite-risks-nfl-leaves-hel 
met-choices-in-players-hands.html [https://perma.cc/FK2J-5NZV]; Taylor Soper, Vicis Reveals 
Price, More Details About High-Tech Football Helmet That Reduces Brain Trauma, GEEKWIRE 
(Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.geekwire.com/2016/vicis-reveals-price-details-high-tech-football-hel 
met-reduces-brain-trauma/ [https://perma.cc/3JAQ-UUZ9]. 
 57 Protecting Players: NFL Head, Neck and Spine Committee’s Protocols Regarding Diagnosis 
and Management of Concussion, NFL PLAY SMART PLAY SAFE, https://www.playsmartplaysafe. 
com/focus-on-safety/protecting-players/nfl-head-neck-spine-committees-protocols-regarding-diag 
nosis-management-concussion/ [https://perma.cc/AP6S-U6M8]. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
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for a player’s return to play.60 Both the NFL and the NFL Players As-
sociation police these policies; in the 2016–17 season, for the first time, 
failure to follow the checklist protocol could be punished with fines or 
lost draft picks.61 
The NFL has also implemented changes to the rules of the game, 
likely as a reaction to negative publicity. One such rule expands the so-
called “defenseless player protection” rule, which protects receivers who 
are clearly tracking the football in a defenseless position.62 Tackling a 
receiver “forcibly in the head or neck area, or us[ing] the crown or hair-
line parts of the helmet,” is now considered a foul.63 Even so, critics say 
that this rule change and others like it are insufficient to prevent head 
trauma on the field and have called for additional changes to the NFL 
rules of play.64 
III. OSHA 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act)65 was 
passed to “assure so far as possible every working man and woman in 
the Nation safe and healthy working conditions,” as “personal injuries 
and illnesses impose a substantial burden upon, and a hindrance to, 
interstate commerce.”66 To effectively accomplish this goal, the OSH Act 
provided for the creation of OSHA.67 
This section describes the OSHA enforcement process to the extent 
helpful to explain what OSHA intervention in the NFL would look like, 
should it happen. It continues by discussing the requirements that must 
be satisfied for OSHA to exercise statutory jurisdiction over NFL teams. 
OSHA must be able to show that an employer-employee relationship 
exists between NFL players and their teams. As there is not a specific 
clause of the OSH Act that applies to this situation, OSHA must also be 
 
 60 Id. 
 61 Protecting Players: Bolstering League Enforcement of its Concussion Protocol, NFL PLAY 
SMART PLAY SAFE (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.playsmartplaysafe.com/focus-on-safety/protecting-
players/bolstering-league-enforcement-of-its-concussion-protocol/ [https://perma.cc/XFQ9-HDVN]. 
 62 New Rules for the 2015–16 Season, NFL OPERATIONS, http://operations.nfl.com/the-rules/ 
new-rules-for-the-2015-16-season [https://perma.cc/JH4E-6GHT]. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See, e.g., Trent Gillies, NFL Needs Big Changes to Concussion Policy, and so Does Everyone 
Else: Expert, CNBC (Apr. 24, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/24/nfl-needs-big-changes-to-con 
cussion-policy-and-so-does-everyone-else-expert.html [https://perma.cc/82PH-DKVD]. 
 65 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012). 
 66 29 U.S.C. § 651. 
 67 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA 3360: REFLECTIONS 
ON OSHA’S HISTORY 4 (2009), https://www.osha.gov/history/OSHA_HISTORY_3360s.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/QGA4-ZHL5]. 
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able to demonstrate that a violation of its general duty clause has oc-
curred. Should it be able to satisfy both of these conditions, OSHA 
would have the statutory jurisdiction to intervene and take action 
against NFL teams. 
A. OSHA Inspections and Enforcement 
OSHA’s jurisdiction covers private sector employers, with the ex-
ception of the self-employed, family farm workers, and government 
workers.68 The agency determines which workplaces to investigate ac-
cording to a published priority list, with the intent of “focus[ing] inspec-
tion resources on the most hazardous workplaces” within this priority 
list.69 Most relevant here are OSHA’s two highest priorities—imminent 
danger situations and severe injuries and illnesses. Imminent danger 
situations involve hazards potentially causing death or serious bodily 
harm; such hazards are top priority and require immediate correction.70 
The severe injuries and illnesses category also concerns work-related 
death, bodily harm, and hospitalization incidents.71 
Compliance and safety health officers responsible for conducting 
OSHA inspections are “experienced, well-trained industrial hygienists 
and safety professionals.”72 These inspections are typically conducted 
without advance notice, although employers can require that compli-
ance officers obtain an inspection warrant prior to entering the 
worksite.73 Inspections occur either on-site or by phone or fax.74 
OSHA categorizes violations as “willful, serious, other-than-seri-
ous, de minimis, failure to abate, and repeated.”75 If an inspector dis-
covers an OSHA violation, oftentimes OSHA will issue citations and 
fines.76 Citations “describe OSHA requirements allegedly violated, list 
any proposed penalties and give a deadline for correcting the alleged 
 
 68 OSHA Enforcement, OSHA, https://www.osha.gov/dep/index.html [https://perma.cc/4A5E-
D3PT]. Government workers located in State Plan states, which cover private and public sector 
employees, are within OSHA’s jurisdiction. 
 69 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA INSPECTIONS (Aug. 
2016), https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/factsheet-inspections.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/X6U7-HHZR] [hereinafter OSHA INSPECTIONS]. From highest priority to lowest priority, OSHA 
inspects: (1) imminent danger situations, (2) severe injuries and illnesses, (3) worker complaints, 
(4) referrals, (5) targeted inspections, and (6) follow-up inspections. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 OSHA Enforcement, supra note 68. 
 75 OSHA INSPECTIONS, supra note 69 (emphasis in original). 
 76 Id. 
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hazards.”77 Penalties may be reduced where the employer is small or 
acts in good faith. Serious violations may incur a reduced penalty pur-
suant to the gravity of the violation.78 For context, OSHA conducted 
35,820 total inspections in fiscal year 2015, and, from these inspections, 
discovered 65,044 total violations.79 
Once OSHA has issued a citation to an employer for an alleged vi-
olation, the employer can respond in two ways. First, the employer has 
the opportunity to participate in an informal conference with the OSHA 
Area Director, with the goal of entering into a settlement agreement to 
“resolve the matter and eliminate the hazard.”80 Employers are also al-
lowed to formally contest the citation within fifteen business days of 
receipt.81 This formal contest is sent to the Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission (OSHRC) for independent review.82 If an 
employer chooses not to challenge an OSHA citation, the citation be-
comes a final order.83 
B. Employer-Employee Relationship 
OSHA jurisdiction requires the existence of an employer-employee 
relationship. Per the OSH Act, an employer is “a person engaged in a 
business affecting commerce who has employees.”84 The OSH Act de-
fines employee in a similarly circular manner: “an employee of an em-
ployer who is employed in a business of his employer which affects com-
merce.”85 
The Supreme Court has held that where Congress uses the term 
“employee” without unambiguously defining it, “Congress intended to 
describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by 
common-law agency doctrine.”86 To determine existence of a common 
law employer-employee relationship, the Supreme Court applies the 
common law test,87 which looks to whether the hiring party exercises 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. Where the violation is deemed to be willful, no good faith penalty adjustment will be 
made. 
 79 2015 Enforcement Summary, OSHA, https://www.osha.gov/dep/2015_enforcement_summa 
ry.html [https://perma.cc/85RN-BFV8]. 
 80 OSHA INSPECTIONS, supra note 69. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 29 U.S.C. § 652(5). 
 85 Id. § 652(6). 
 86 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992). 
 87 Occasionally, the OSHRC will instead apply the economic realities test to determine 
whether an employment relationship exists. The economic realities test is based on the principle 
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the right to control the manner and means by which the product is re-
alized.88 There are a number of factors relevant to this inquiry: 
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; 
the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between 
the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign ad-
ditional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired 
party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method 
of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assis-
tants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the 
hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provi-
sion of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired 
party.89 
All incidents of the relationship require assessment and weighing; no 
single factor is decisive.90 The ultimate inquiry is: “who controls the 
work environment?”91 
Courts applying the common law test have used fact-intensive 
analyses to find an employment relationship.92 Where the purported 
employer is responsible for marketing, accounting, administrative, and 
financial services, and provides the tools and equipment necessary; and 
where the worker’s main contribution is her labor, courts are likely to 
find an employment relationship. This is especially so where the worker 
gives the labor in question exclusively to the purported employer.93 
C. The General Duty Clause 
The majority of OSHA regulation occurs through enforcement of 
specific standards that were propagated to protect workers from serious 
hazards.94 The OSH Act’s general duty clause requires that an employer 
 
that “employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to 
which they render service.” See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (finding a band 
leader to be the employer of the band members under the economic realities test). The Supreme 
Court has held that various factors are relevant to this determination: “permanency of the relation, 
the skill required, the investment if [sic] the facilities for work and opportunities for profit or loss 
from the activities.” Id. The result is typically the same under both the common law test and the 
economic realities test; this Comment assumes the result would be the same here. 
 88 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 323. 
 89 Id. 
 90 NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968). 
 91 Loomis Cabinet Co. v. OSHA, 20 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding an employment re-
lationship between a cabinet company and a partnership contractually obligated to manufacture 
cabinets). 
 92 Id. at 941–42. 
 93 Id. 
 94 OSHA At-a-Glance, OSHA, https://www.osha.gov/Publications/3439at-a-glance.pdf [https:// 
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furnish a place of employment “free from recognized hazards that are 
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his em-
ployees.”95 The House Committee on Education and Labor has indicated 
that the purpose of the general duty clause is to “provide for the protec-
tion of employees who are working under such unique circumstances 
that no standard has yet been enacted to cover this situation.”96 This 
clause functions as a catch-all to provide OSHA with a vehicle for en-
forcement where “no specific OSHA standard applies to the hazard.”97 
Neither the OSH Act nor OSHA standards contain a specific carve-out 
for professional sports. 
The general duty clause does not impose strict liability on employ-
ers; rather, it limits liability of employers to preventable hazards.98 
Where a hazard is both recognizable and preventable, the typical com-
mon law doctrines of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and 
comparative negligence do not qualify or modify the employer’s duty to 
its employees.99 To establish that the general duty clause has been vio-
lated, the Secretary of Labor must show that: 
(1) an activity or condition in the employer’s workplace pre-
sented a hazard to an employee, (2) either the employer or the 
industry recognized the condition or activity as a hazard, (3) the 
hazard was likely to or actually caused death or serious physical 
harm, and (4) a feasible means to eliminate or materially reduce 
the hazard existed.100 
Of the four prongs, the most ambiguous are the second and fourth (that 
a hazard be recognizable and preventable, respectively); these prongs 
are discussed in greater detail below. 
 
perma.cc/6RPM-VVH4]. Examples of OSHA standards include limitations on exposure to hazard-
ous chemicals and “requirements to provide fall protection, prevent trenching cave-ins, prevent 
exposure to some infectious diseases, ensure the safety of workers who enter confined spaces, pre-
vent exposure to such harmful substances as asbestos and lead, put guards on machines, provide 
respirators or other safety equipment, and provide training for certain dangerous jobs.” Id. 
 95 29 U.S.C. § 654. 
 96 SeaWorld of Florida, LLC v. Perez, 748 F.3d 1202, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasis in orig-
inal). 
 97 OSHA At-A-Glance, supra note 94. 
 98 Whirlpool Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 645 F.2d 1096, 1098 
(D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 99 Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 489 F.2d 
1257, 1266 n. 36 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 100 Fabi Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 508 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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1. Recognizable hazards 
There are various ways in which a hazard can be considered recog-
nizable for the purpose of invoking OSHA’s general duty clause. Actual 
knowledge is sufficient to prove that the employer recognized the haz-
ard in question.101 Where an employer has actual knowledge of the haz-
ard, compliance with existing standards that fail to address the hazard 
will not absolve the employer of liability under the general duty clause; 
the employer is still required to provide its employees with a place of 
employment free from these recognized hazards.102 
In the absence of actual knowledge, a hazard will be considered 
recognizable where it is obvious and glaring.103 This is the case even 
where industry practice has been to disregard the hazard.104 Even so, a 
hazard need not be easily recognizable by humans without the assis-
tance of technical instruments to be considered “recognized.”105 
2. Preventable hazards 
Even where a hazard is deemed recognizable, employers cannot be 
held liable unless it is also preventable. Absolute liability for employers 
is not the goal; rather, the general duty clause seeks to impose a duty 
that is achievable.106 For this reason, there must be some demonstra-
tion that “feasible measures can be taken to reduce materially the like-
lihood of death or serious bodily harm resulting to employees” for a haz-
ard to be considered within the scope of the general duty clause.107 
The preventability requirement carries with it a related require-
ment of realism. Recognized hazards are not deemed to be preventable 
where they are “so idiosyncratic and implausible in motive or means” 
that industry experts would disregard the hazard when prescribing a 
safety program.108 Similarly, hazards are not considered preventable 
 
 101 Magma Copper Co. v. Marshall, 608 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 102 Safeway, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 382 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th 
Cir. 2004). 
 103 Tri-State Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 685 
F.2d 878, 880–81 (4th Cir. 1982). 
 104 Id. 
 105 American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 501 
F.2d 504, 511 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 106 Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 622 F.2d 1160, 
1164 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 489 F.2d 
1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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where elimination “would require methods of hiring, training, monitor-
ing, or sanctioning workers which are either so untested or so expensive 
that safety experts would substantially concur in thinking the methods 
infeasible.”109 
3. General duty clause, as applied 
Were OSHA to take enforcement action against NFL teams, it 
would be the first time the agency has attempted to regulate profes-
sional football. In 2014, OSHA took a similarly novel action when it is-
sued citations against SeaWorld.110 These citations followed the death 
of a SeaWorld trainer in an interaction with one of the performing 
whales; OSHA found that SeaWorld had “expos[ed] the trainers to rec-
ognized hazards when working in close contact with killer whales dur-
ing performances” and so had violated the general duty clause.111 An 
administrative law judge confirmed OSHA’s findings. 
On appeal, SeaWorld unsuccessfully argued that the hazard in 
question was neither recognizable nor preventable through feasible 
means.112 In its consideration of recognizability, the D.C. Circuit noted 
that SeaWorld itself had kept records of incident reports involving vio-
lent activity by its killer whales.113 This was sufficient evidence of “Sea-
World’s recognition that the killer whales interacting with trainers are 
dangerous and unpredictable.”114 SeaWorld’s assertion that the pro-
posed remedy of limiting trainer-whale contact was not a feasible rem-
edy within the scope of OSHA’s enforcement abilities similarly did not 
convince the court. Central to the court’s finding was the fact that “[t]he 
remedy imposed for SeaWorld’s violations does not change the essential 
nature of its business.”115 The court also noted, albeit in dicta, a possible 
related question—whether “physical contact between players is ‘intrin-
sic’ to professional football in a way that it is not to a killer whale 
show.”116 
 
 109 Id. 
 110 SeaWorld of Florida, LLC v. Perez, 748 F.3d 1202, 1204–05 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 1207. 
 113 Id. at 1209. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 1210. 
 116 Id. at 1213. 
23 BRENSON PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/17  12:17 PM 
595] NFL CONCUSSION SCANDAL AND OSHA REGULATION 611 
 
IV. OSHA REGULATION OF NFL TEAMS 
OSHA has authored two Standard Interpretation letters regarding 
its jurisdiction to regulate professional sports. In a 2003 letter (“2003 
Letter”), the Acting Director of OSHA’s Directorate of Evaluation and 
Analysis replied to concerns voiced by an employee of a firm that in-
sures professional sports teams.117 The employee was concerned that 
“teams have historically omitted information on the injuries and illness 
of their players from their [Bureau of Labor Statistics] survey responses 
in the belief that OSHA considers professional football and baseball 
players to be ‘independent contractors’ rather than ‘employees.’”118 In 
response, the Acting Director noted that OSHA had not issued a formal 
interpretation, nor did relevant case law exist, on whether professional 
sports players are independent contractors or employees under the com-
mon law test.119 Because of this, he explained, OSHA had not officially 
determined whether it has jurisdiction over professional sports 
teams.120 
In the 2008 interpretation letter (“2008 Letter”), OSHA reiterated 
that it had yet to make an official determination on the question of 
whether professional athletes are employees or independent contrac-
tors.121 The 2008 Letter also noted that “[i]n most cases . . . OSHA does 
not take enforcement action with regard to professional athletes.”122 
The 2003 Letter and the 2008 Letter constitute the extent of the 
action OSHA has taken thus far against NFL teams. 
Having established that OSHA jurisdiction in this case requires 
findings of an employment relationship and a violation of the general 
duty clause, the Comment will proceed to apply the law to the NFL con-
cussion scandal. First, the Comment will demonstrate that NFL players 
satisfy the common law employment relationship test and so are em-
ployees of NFL teams. Next, the Comment will apply jurisprudence re-
garding OSHA’s general duty clause to NFL teams to conclude the fol-
lowing: as currently played, professional football presents a hazard to 
NFL players; the industry recognizes the hazard; the hazard is one that 
 
 117 See Letter from Frank Frodyma, Acting Dir., Directorate of Evaluation and Analysis, 
OSHA, to Dave Chamberlain (June 23, 2003), https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_ 
document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24901 [https://perma.cc/Z7NS-JH6F]. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, Dir., Directorate of Enforcement Programs, OSHA, to 
Robert Van Laanen (Sept. 12, 2008), https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document? 
p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=27301 [https://perma.cc/U5XE-JET8]. 
 122 Id. 
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presents a risk or reality of bodily harm or death; and, with changes to 
the game, it is likely and feasible that the hazard can be materially re-
duced. Moreover, should the OSHRC proceed in a fact-intensive man-
ner, relying only on information in the record, a court would be likely to 
uphold its findings. 
This Comment will then discuss why OSHA should regulate NFL 
teams. Regulation of NFL teams would act as a complement to the cur-
rent and recent threats of litigation, resulting in a greater likelihood of 
change and prevention of injuries. Furthermore, OSHA regulation of 
NFL teams would work to combat the perverse incentives inherent in 
the current NFL concussion and safety protocol. 
A. OSHA Can Regulate NFL Teams 
In order for OSHA to have statutory jurisdiction over NFL teams, 
it must be able to show that an employment relationship exists between 
the NFL teams and their players, and it must be able to establish a 
violation of its general duty clause. Both of these requirements can be 
satisfied. Also important is the level of deference that a reviewing court 
will give to findings made by the OSHRC. If OSHA takes action against 
NFL teams, the teams will surely challenge its authority to do so; ac-
cordingly, for the OSHRC’s findings to have any significant meaning, it 
is important to know that a reviewing court will uphold these findings. 
Because of the highly deferential standard that a reviewing court would 
apply in this situation, it is very likely that a court would uphold the 
OSHRC’s findings. 
1. NFL players are employees of NFL teams 
Pursuant to the common law test, NFL players are employees of 
the NFL teams with which they contract. NFL teams exert considerable 
and sufficient control over NFL players. The individual teams provide 
football equipment and uniforms, occasionally with options for the play-
ers to purchase additional uniforms or wear their own preferred cleats 
or helmets.123 Team practices and games are played at locations desig-
nated by the teams, as well as at times designated by either individual 
teams or the league.124 While teams do not limit players in their ability 
 
 123 Chris Valenti Answers Your Questions, DENVER BRONCOS (Jul. 1, 2005), http://www.denver 
broncos.com/news-and-blogs/article-1/Chris-Valenti-Answers-Your-Questions/f6987292-7892-11d 
f-ba56-acc8e62813e9 [https://perma.cc/VB85-H9XG] (indicating that the team supplies footballs 
and other practice equipment, as well as uniforms and cleats). 
 124 See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 16, at 131. While teams are not al-
lowed to require players to complete off-season workouts, players must complete these workouts 
to receive compensation for them. The CBA limits the scope and timing of off-season workouts, but 
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to practice or work out on their own, these voluntary workouts are not 
considered to be part of the team’s off-season workout program and are 
uncompensated.125 Teams can require participation in mandatory min-
icamps during the off-season and mandatory practices and workouts 
during the NFL season.126 
The duration of the working relationship is for the length of the 
player’s contract with the team; even so, the team can terminate its re-
lationship should the player suffer injury or perform unsatisfactorily, 
or if the team wishes to create room for “salary cap purposes.”127 Even 
though these methods of termination typically require the contract sal-
ary to be paid out to the player,128 they indicate that the NFL teams 
control and determine the lifespan of the working arrangement. Players 
have the opportunity to increase the amount of money they earn per 
year by participating in optional off-season workouts, but, as discussed 
above, these workouts are scheduled by the team.129 Player choice in off-
season workouts does not diminish the amount of control each team ex-
ercises over its players. NFL teams hire their own staff and coaches; 
players do not necessarily influence these hiring decisions, although it 
seems plausible that star players might have informal influence over 
this process.130 
Control manifests itself in other ways, too—NFL teams can dictate 
player uniforms as well as standards for player conduct (within the 
scope of league rules and the CBA).131 The teams also impose media, 
marketing, and public relations requirements on each player, demon-
strating that the extent of their control over players extends beyond 
stadium walls.132 Perhaps most importantly, NFL teams are in the busi-
ness of playing football and marketing the game and its players to the 
public. NFL players are at the heart of the business of playing football 
and are also central to the process of marketing the game to the public. 
Altogether, the situational factors of the relationship between NFL 
 
within these limits the teams determine the scheduling and content of the workouts. 
 125 Id. §§ 3, 8f. 
 126 See id. at 139; see also NFL Player Contract, supra note 16, § 33 (indicating that failure to 
practice with or play for the team constitutes default of the player’s obligations under the contract). 
 127 See NFL Player Contract, supra note 16. 
 128 Id. Situations exist that would decrease the amount owed to the terminated player; for the 
purpose of this Comment, these do not have any significant impact on the analysis. 
 129 See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 16, at 139. 
 130 See, e.g., NFL Team Jobs!, NFL, http://footballjobs.teamworkonline.com/teamwork/jobs/de 
fault.cfm [https://perma.cc/C6UJ-VSNN] (listing types of positions various NFL teams seek to fill). 
 131 See Chris Valenti Answers Your Questions, supra note 123. While the team requires the 
players to wear helmets, choice of helmet is left to the players. See Borden, supra note 56; Soper, 
supra note 56. 
 132 See NFL Player Contract, supra note 16. 
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players and teams point strongly towards the existence of an employ-
ment relationship and, with it, OSHA jurisdiction. 
Those who disagree with this assessment might point toward the 
common law test’s inquiry into the skill required to perform the work 
in question. A greater degree of skill required tends to point toward the 
worker’s status as an independent contractor rather than an em-
ployee,133 and professional football is conventionally thought to require 
a great deal of skill.134 But courts have found that skill is not dispositive 
when the purported employee’s primary contribution is labor. For ex-
ample, in Loomis Cabinet Co. v. OSHA135 the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
OSHA’s finding of an employment relationship between a cabinet com-
pany and a partnership contractually obligated to manufacture cabi-
nets.136 The court noted that the company was responsible for market-
ing, accounting, administrative, and financial services, and provided 
the tools and equipment necessary for the cabinet construction.137 In 
contrast, the partners’ main contribution was their skilled labor, which 
was given exclusively to the company in question.138 Much like in 
Loomis, NFL players’ primary contribution is their labor.139 
There is one notable difference between the employment relation-
ship in Loomis and that of the NFL teams and players, though—prom-
inent NFL players contribute not only their football skills but also their 
personal brand to the NFL teams for which they play. Franchises ben-
efit from having a Russell Wilson or a Peyton Manning on their rosters 
because of the personal brands built around these players’ skills; fans 
are arguably more inclined to buy merchandise related to these players 
or to attend or watch games than they would be absent the players’ per-
sonal brands. This seems to cut against a finding of an employment re-
lationship. Even so, and especially in a cumulative view of the situation, 
it is clear that the NFL teams control the work environment. Thus, NFL 
players are considered employees and the employment relationship re-
quirement for OSHA jurisdiction is satisfied. 
 
 133 See, e.g., Andrew E. Tanick, Independent Contractor or Employee? The Focus Shifts Again, 
67-SEP BENCH & B. MINN. 16, 17 (Sept. 2010). 
 134 Indeed, the standard contract states “Club employs Player as a skilled football player.” See, 
e.g., NFL Player Contract, supra note 16. 
 135 20 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 136 Id. at 941–42. 
 137 Id. at 942. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
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2. The NFL’s handling of the concussion scandal is a violation of 
OSHA’s general duty clause 
To determine whether a violation of the general duty clause has 
occurred, the OSHRC applies a four-prong test.140 As discussed in 
greater detail below, each of these prongs can be sufficiently satisfied 
to justify OSHA intervention in the NFL concussion scandal. Both the 
NFL and its teams have recognized that the concussion scandal pre-
sents a hazard to NFL players. Concussions and head trauma lead to 
the development of CTE, which has caused death in former NFL play-
ers. And a feasible means of eliminating or materially reducing the haz-
ard exists. The OSHRC can choose to fine the NFL teams in an attempt 
to incentivize further rule changes, and it can issue citations to the NFL 
requiring rule changes. Such rule changes might include a movement 
towards a style of tackling that removes the players’ heads from the 
game. The NFL teams also might implement practice or game-time pol-
icies that incorporate drills performed without helmets. Both of these 
methods satisfy the feasibility test because implementation of the 
methods is possible, would materially reduce the hazard in question, 
and would not change the essential nature of the NFL’s business. 
a. Professional football, as currently played, presents a 
hazard to NFL players 
This prong of the test is easily satisfied. As of 2015, NFL players 
were suffering an average of 0.43 concussions per game.141 Since the 
2015 season, the NFL has gotten more serious about enforcing its safety 
protocols to address the aftermath of a collision or injury.142 The NFL 
has implemented rule changes aimed at decreasing the number of con-
cussions suffered by its players, but despite these rule changes, the 
2015–16 season saw an increase in reported concussions of as much as 
fifty-eight percent, and the total number of reported concussions in the 
2016–17 season was on par with the average of the past four years.143 
Because this is only the number of reported concussions, there is reason 
to believe that the actual number of concussions suffered is much 
higher. As discussed later on, there are perverse incentives at every 
 
 140 Fabi Constr. Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 508 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 141 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 142 Protecting Players: Bolstering League Enforcement of its Concussion Protocol, NFL PLAY 
SMART PLAY SAFE, https://www.playsmartplaysafe.com/focus-on-safety/protecting-players/bolster 
ing-league-enforcement-of-its-concussion-protocol/ [https://perma.cc/XFQ9-HDVN]. 
 143 Gillies, supra note 64; Walder, supra note 3. 
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step of the reporting system, which may work to ensure that concus-
sions and head injuries are underreported or, worse, not reported at all. 
Concussions and repeated head-trauma present a hazard to NFL play-
ers as these lead to the development of CTE, which can result in demen-
tia, depression, and occasionally suicide.144 
b. The NFL teams and the industry have recognized that 
professional football, as currently played, is a hazard 
To find a violation of the general duty clause, the OSHRC must 
determine that the offending circumstance was sufficiently recogniza-
ble. This prong of the test, often referred to as the recognizability prong, 
can be satisfied either with actual knowledge of the hazard or where 
the hazard is “obvious and glaring.”145 Here, there is sufficient evidence 
that the NFL teams and the NFL as an industry had actual knowledge 
of the hazard presented by professional football as currently played. 
In 2009, the NFL officially admitted the link between concussions 
and other long-term health problems.146 And recently, the NFL’s top 
health and safety officer has explicitly acknowledged the link between 
football-related head trauma and neurodegenerative diseases (like 
CTE).147 Therefore, the NFL’s actual knowledge of the hazard is no 
longer in question. 
c. This hazard is likely to, and actually has, caused death 
and serious physical harm to NFL players 
The NFL’s admission of the link between football-related head 
trauma and neurodegenerative diseases makes this prong of the test 
fairly straightforward. A number of current and former NFL players 
who suffered from CTE have died in recent years. Many of these deaths 
 
 144 Ezell, supra note 25. A recent medical study diagnosed the brains of 110 out of 111 deceased 
NFL players with CTE. See generally Jesse Mez, M.D., M.S., et al., Clinicopathological Evaluation 
of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in Players of American Football, 318 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 
360 (2017); Joe Ward et al., 111 NFL Brains, All but One Had C.T.E., N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/25/sports/football/nfl-cte.html?smid=fb-nytimes&s 
mtyp=cur&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/F6AL-9KFW]. The brains used in the medical study were do-
nated to science by the players or their families, which presents a potential self-selection problem; 
even so, the staggering results indicate that the long-term effects of repeated head trauma may be 
more severe than previously anticipated. 
 145 Tri-State Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 685 
F.2d 878, 880–81 (4th Cir. 1982). 
 146 Ezell, supra note 25. 
 147 Steve Fainaru, NFL Acknowledges, for the First Time, Link Between Football, Brain Dis-
ease, ESPN (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/14972296/top-nfl-official-
acknowledges-link-football-related-head-trauma-cte-first [https://perma.cc/H52C-H2MG]. 
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can be linked either directly or indirectly to CTE; some committed sui-
cide, which is more likely to occur where one suffers from CTE.148 Some 
have passed from accidental overdose of pain medication taken to re-
lieve chronic pain suffered from past football injuries, including head 
trauma.149 Others have died from complications with dementia, a men-
tal disorder that is a symptom of CTE.150 
In SeaWorld, the OSHRC found that the recognizability prong was 
satisfied where a trainer’s interaction with a killer whale resulted in 
her death.151 Here, with numerous examples of CTE in current and for-
mer NFL players who have suffered football-related head trauma, there 
is ample evidence that the hazard is likely to and actually has caused 
death and serious physical harm to NFL players. 
d. A feasible means to eliminate or materially reduce the 
hazard exists 
The feasibility prong of the common law test presents the biggest 
challenge to OSHA regulation of professional football. To pass this 
prong, the OSHRC must demonstrate that feasible measures exist that 
will “reduce materially the likelihood of death or serious bodily harm 
resulting to employees.”152 For a hazard to be considered preventable 
under the feasibility prong, it must not be so idiosyncratic and implau-
sible that industry experts would disregard this hazard in prescribing 
a safety program.153 Furthermore, prevention of the hazard in question 
cannot require “methods of hiring, training, monitoring, or sanctioning 
workers which are either so untested or so expensive that safety experts 
would substantially concur in thinking the methods infeasible.”154 Re-
lated is the concept of the essential nature of the business; a measure 
to prevent a hazard will not be considered feasible if it changes the es-
sential nature of the employer’s business. 
In this spirit, for the OSHRC to successfully regulate NFL teams, 
it must show that there is a feasible means to correct the hazard. At 
first blush, this seems implausible. The rules of play and league policies 
 
 148 The N.F.L.’s Tragic C.T.E. Roll Call, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/in 
teractive/2016/02/03/sports/football/nfl-brain-disease-cte-concussions.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ 
M4YC-YR4C]. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 24 BNA OSHC 1303 at *13 (No. 10-1705, 2012) (ALJ). 
 152 Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 622 F.2d 1160, 
1164 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 153 Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 489 F.2d 
1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 154 Id. 
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are created by the NFL as a league, so enforcement against individual 
NFL teams may not result in correction of the hazard. But the amend-
ment process for league rules requires an affirmative vote of the 
teams.155 As such, it is reasonable to expect that OSHA enforcement 
against the individual NFL teams would result in change to league 
rules and policy. 
The OSHRC can regulate the NFL teams through either monetary 
fines or citations that require correction of the hazard in question.156 
Should the OSHRC choose to issue a citation against the NFL teams, 
there are at least two solutions to the hazard that it might propose: a 
ban on headfirst tackling and a limit on use of helmets during either 
practice or gameplay. Each of these are dealt with in further detail be-
low, along with a demonstration that the proposed solutions would 
likely not change the essential nature of the business. 
i. The OSHRC has two methods of regulating the NFL 
teams: monetary fines and citations requiring correction of the hazard 
There are two approaches that the OSHRC can take in its attempt 
to regulate NFL teams. First, the OSHRC could impose a monetary fine 
on NFL teams. It is unlikely that the OSHRC would impose a fine so 
large that it would be considered in violation of the feasibility prong. 
The initial penalty assessed for a willful or repeated violation is 
$126,749, with additional penalties of $12,675 per day beyond the 
abatement date for failure to abate.157 The largest cumulative penalty 
that the OSHRC has assessed since 1988 totaled $81,340,000 against 
BP Products North America, Inc. due to repeated willful violations and 
failure to abate.158 Even a penalty of this size seems miniscule in com-
parison with the NFL’s coffers. In 2015, the league itself brought in 
$7.24 billion in revenue.159 This was split between the 32 teams, with 
each team receiving $226.4 million.160 This number does not include 
money made via local revenue sources (e.g., regional merchandise and 
ticket sales), so the actual amount of annual revenue flowing to NFL 
teams is likely much higher.161 Should the league choose to pay fines 
 
 155 Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League, supra note 15, at 48. 
 156 See OSHA INSPECTIONS, supra note 69. 
 157 OSHA Penalties, OSHA, https://www.osha.gov/penalties/ [https://perma.cc/GY34-NF58]. 
 158 Top Enforcement Cases Based on Total Issued Penalty, OSHA, https://www.osha.gov/dep/en 
forcement/top_cases.html [https://perma.cc/M29L-BP24]. 
 159 James Brady, The NFL Brought in Enough Money Last Year to Pay for 10 Pluto Missions, 
SB NATION (July 20, 2015), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2015/7/20/9006401/nfl-teams-revenue-tv-
deal-7-billion [https://perma.cc/Q4F2-LS3P]. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Ike Ejiochi, How the NFL Makes the Most Money of Any Pro Sport, CNBC (Sept. 4, 2014), 
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assessed by the OSHRC on behalf of its teams, the feasibility prong 
surely would not be implicated. If, as is more likely, the individual 
teams were assessed penalties by the OSHRC, their share of revenue 
from the NFL would likely more than cover any penalty assessed.162 
The OSHRC could also issue citations against NFL teams, which 
would include requirements that the hazard be corrected. In this situa-
tion, the OSHRC would be required to show that the NFL teams could 
feasibly correct the hazard, subject to the complexities above. Of the 
potential measures that the OSHRC could propose, two seem the most 
likely to result in less hazardous conduct long-term: (1) a ban on hitting 
with the head and (2) elimination of the requirement that players wear 
helmets during games. The former of these is more realistic, although 
the latter has also been proposed; both are derived from American foot-
ball’s sister sport, rugby. 
A change in the tackling method, so as to further remove the head 
from the tackle process, has the potential to be effective in reducing in-
juries from football-related head trauma. American football players are 
taught to play using the method of “heads-up tackling.”163 This tackle 
technique has players “tak[ing] several, small steps before lunging for-
ward with their heads facing upwards, wrap[ping] the opposing player, 
then tak[ing] them off their feet and to the ground.”164 Implementation 
of a league-wide ban on heads-up tackling would require some invest-
ment by the league and by individual teams to retrain players, but 
likely not at a prohibitive cost. NFL teams practice frequently in the 
preseason and during the season; while it would take some time for cur-
rent players to relearn how to tackle, it seems realistic that changes to 
training techniques could help players to learn to tackle without hitting 
head first. 
A second proposed solution is to eliminate the requirement that 
NFL players wear helmets during practices and games. At first glance, 
this seems radical—if the goal is to prevent head injuries, taking pro-
tective headgear out of the situation feels counterintuitive. A number 
of commentators have suggested that removing helmets would make 




 162 Brady, supra note 159. 
 163 Aamna Mohdin, To Deal with Its Concussion Crisis, the NFL Is Starting to Learn from 
Rugby, QUARTZ (Sept. 19, 2015), http://qz.com/504364/hey-football-players-heres-a-thing-or-two-
you-can-learn-about-tackling-from-rugby/ [https://perma.cc/9VW7-29D7]. 
 164 Id. For a visual example of “heads-up tackling,” see Tackling the Heads Up Way, NFL, 
http://www.nfl.com/videos/nfl-videos/0ap1000000066928/Tackling-the-Heads-Up-way [https://per 
ma.cc/MM32-DXH3]. 
 165 See, e.g., Richard Boadu, Is No Helmet and No Pads the Future of Tackle Football?, COMPLEX 
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know that their heads are not protected, they will be less likely to initi-
ate a situation that would result in head impact.166 Studies have been 
done at the university-level that show positive results. In one study, 
players who removed their helmets for five minutes of drills after prac-
tices twice a week during the three-week preseason and once a week 
during the regular season suffered twenty-eight percent fewer head im-
pacts.167 By learning tackling techniques without wearing a helmet, 
players are less likely to tackle with their heads (even if they are wear-
ing a helmet) during games.168 Elimination of the requirement that 
players wear helmets during games without sufficient accompanying 
training would likely result in an increase in physical injury in the 
short-term, but if players are trained more frequently without their hel-
mets on, it seems likely that there would be an accompanying drop in 
concussions on the field. 
ii. The proposed solutions would likely not be considered 
to change the essential nature of the game 
One question remains: would either of these proposed solutions so 
change the essential nature of the game such that they would be con-
sidered infeasible? For a ban on heads-up tackling, the answer is likely 
not. Since 2012, the Seattle Seahawks have been training their players 
to tackle in a new way, so as to “take the head out of the equation.”169 
The fact that the Seahawks have implemented this change on their own 
indicates that this would not be a drastic change to the essential nature 
of the business—otherwise, it can be assumed, they would not have im-
plemented the change.170 
 
(Oct. 23, 2016), http://www.complex.com/sports/2016/10/no-helmet-no-pads-football [https://per 
ma.cc/2SC6-XZ9F]; Lindsay Gibbs, Could Getting Rid of Helmets Actually Make Football Safer?, 
THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 7, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/could-getting-rid-of-helmets-actually-
make-football-safer-75393ffe5c32#.bsw3npen7 [https://perma.cc/VDQ7-XCSP]; Bill Bradley, Cur-
rent, Former Players Suggest Doing Away with Football Helmets, NFL (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www. 
nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000299501/printable/current-former-players-suggest-doing-away-wit 
h-football-helmets [https://perma.cc/F8GQ-63HS]. 
 166 See Gibbs, supra note 165. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Mohdin, supra note 163; see also Sheil Kapadia, Rugby-Style Tackling Continues to Work 
for Seahawks’ Defense, ESPN (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.espn.com/blog/seattle-seahawks/post/_/ 
id/17538/rugby-style-tackling-continues-to-work-for-seahawks-defense [https://perma.cc/NA7B-R 
5EQ] (noting that on average, the Seattle Seahawks have sustained fewer concussions in the past 
three years than 28 teams in the league). 
 170 For more information on the Seattle Seahawks’s tackling techniques (the “Hawk Tackle”), 
see Rugby Today, Seahawks Head Coach Pete Carroll Teaches Rugby Tackling, YOUTUBE (July 29, 
2014), https://youtu.be/7HihjPApzCg [https://perma.cc/XVM9-LZL3]. 
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It is harder to imagine that the OSHRC or the NFL would turn 
toward helmet-less play as a solution, but if they did, it would likely not 
be considered a change to the essential nature of the game. The ulti-
mate query is whether head-first collisions (with or without a helmet) 
are crucial to the essential nature of the NFL. The OSHRC would likely 
find that head-first collisions are not crucial. In SeaWorld, the OSHRC 
found that a ban on trainer-interaction with killer whales did not 
change the essential nature of the business, despite SeaWorld’s history 
of marketing interactions between trainers and killer whales as a prom-
inent part of its business.171 This demonstrates the leeway the OSHRC 
has to determine whether something is essential to the nature of a given 
business. Should the OSHRC be inclined to pursue action against the 
NFL, it would likely be similarly inclined to find that head-first colli-
sions are not essential to the nature of professional football. 
e. Vagueness challenges to the general duty clause will 
likely fail 
NFL teams may attempt to argue that OSHA’s general duty clause 
is vague as applied. In SeaWorld, the parties made a similar argument. 
Here, the NFL teams would argue that the vagueness of the general 
duty clause afforded them insufficient notice of the potential for OSHA 
enforcement.172 In SeaWorld, the D.C. Circuit disposed of this argument 
by noting that SeaWorld necessarily had fair notice because the hazard 
in question was preventable. Notably, “[g]iven evidence of continued in-
cidents . . . SeaWorld could have anticipated that abatement measures 
it had applied after other incidents would be required” and that the pro-
cedures in question “were not entirely effective at stopping [the haz-
ard].”173 Here, as in SeaWorld, the employer’s top-of-the-line safety pro-
tocol and protective gear have been insufficient to keep its employees 
safe; recognition of ongoing hazards is sufficient to put NFL teams on 
notice of potential regulation. This type of argument would likely not be 
a barrier to OSHA action. 
3. Courts will uphold the OSHRC’s findings 
Should the OSHRC decide to take action against NFL teams, it is 
likely that the teams would choose to challenge the ruling. The case for 
 
 171 SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 24 BNA OSHC 1303 at *1, *31 (No. 10-1705, 2012) (ALJ) (noting 
that “killer whales are SeaWorld’s signature attraction”). 
 172 SeaWorld of Florida, LLC v. Perez, 748 F.3d 1202, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
 173 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted.) 
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regulation is not black and white, but the OSHRC should feel comfort-
able taking action here, as it will be afforded strong deference by the 
courts. 
OSHRC decisions are upheld unless “arbitrary and capricious, not 
in accordance with the law, or in excess of the authority granted by 
OSHA.”174 The OSH legislation provides that “[t]he findings of the 
[OSHRC] with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial 
evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive.”175 
This is measured by the “substantial evidence test,” which courts apply 
to determine whether to uphold the OSHRC’s factual findings.176 The 
four prongs of the general duty clause applicability test, as well as the 
existence of an employment relationship, are findings of fact.177 
For a factual finding to pass the substantial evidence test, there 
must be “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion, taking into account whatever in the 
record fairly detracts from its weight.”178 In practice, review under the 
substantial evidence test is highly deferential and typically results in 
courts upholding the OSHRC’s factual finding. Even so, courts will find 
the OSHRC’s decision to have failed the substantial evidence test where 
the OSHRC’s findings were beyond the scope of the record,179 the find-
ings in question were not supported by any evidence,180 there is not “an 
accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and result,”181 or the 
evidence overwhelmingly supports a conclusion opposite to that of the 
OSHRC.182 
Assuming the OSHRC makes its decisions from information found 
in the record, and in doing so neither goes beyond the scope of the record 
nor makes a decision based on no evidence at all, it is likely that a re-
viewing court will give deference to and uphold the OSHRC’s findings. 
 
 174 Loomis Cabinet Co. v. OSHA, 20 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1994) 
 175 29 U.S.C. § 660(a). 
 176 Id. 
 177 See, e.g., SeaWorld, 748 F.3d at 1215 (applying the substantial evidence standard to finding 
of preventability); Loomis, 20 F.3d at 942 (applying the substantial evidence standard to finding 
of an employment relationship). 
 178 Astra Pharmaceutical Prods. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 681 F.2d 
69, 72 (1st Cir. 1982) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 488 (1951) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 179 See Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 489 
F.2d 1257, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 180 General Elec. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 540 F.2d 67, 69 (2d 
Cir. 1976). 
 181 Chao v. Gunite Corp., 442 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 182 Daniel Int’l Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 683 F.2d 361, 364 (11th 
Cir. 1982). 
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B. OSHA Should Regulate NFL Teams 
As established above, OSHA has the power to regulate NFL teams 
and courts would give deference to OSHA should it choose to regulate 
the teams. But should OSHA regulate NFL teams? Yes. Enforcement of 
OSHA’s general duty clause against the teams would be an effective 
method of preventing the serious injuries that have come to be nearly 
synonymous with the NFL. OSHA regulation would serve as a comple-
ment to litigation that has been brought against the NFL, and would 
combat the perverse incentives inherent in the current system. 
1. OSHA regulation and litigation as complements 
OSHA regulation would be an effective complement to litigation as 
a method of encouraging player-friendly institutional change in profes-
sional football. Thus far, litigation has resulted mainly in monetary 
damages, which theoretically should incentivize change to professional 
football; however, these monetary damages were accompanied by set-
tlement clauses that allowed the NFL to deny any and all wrongdoing 
associated with the concussion scandal. The NFL has implemented 
some rule changes in reaction to litigation and public pressure. Despite 
this, concussion rates remain high and critics have argued that the rule 
changes are insufficient. OSHA can choose to enforce its general duty 
clause against NFL teams either through monetary fines or through 
requirements to remove the hazard. Both of these options would serve 
as effective complements to civil litigation. 
Monetary fines would compound with the damages due as a result 
of settlement (as well as other potential damages resulting from future 
litigation). The NFL and its teams have deep pockets, but these entities 
are businesses and likely to respond to financial incentives. Therefore, 
imposition of additional monetary fines by OSHA would increase the 
likelihood that the NFL and its member teams internalize costs of con-
cussions and voluntarily make changes to the game to reduce risk of 
injury to players. 
There is some reason to doubt the effectiveness of monetary fines, 
though—the NFL has yet to respond to financial incentives (e.g., settle-
ment payments) by changing the game to make it less dangerous. 
Would OSHA really impose fines so significant that the NFL changes 
its behavior? Perhaps. As discussed above, OSHA has imposed sizeable 
fines in the past, but these large fines were the result of numerous doc-
umented violations. In light of this consideration, OSHA may instead 
choose to enforce its general duty clause through requirements to re-
move the hazard. 
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This enforcement tactic would also act as a complement to litiga-
tion. Litigation is inherently under-inclusive. This was perhaps best 
demonstrated by the NFL Players’ class action settlement agreement, 
especially if the resulting rule changes are seen as insufficient. Practi-
cally speaking, the settlement agreement benefitted current and past 
NFL players who have suffered concussions and CTE but does not pro-
tect players from suffering head trauma on the field in future games. 
OSHA regulation in the form of additional rule changes would work to 
protect future players and prevent football-related head trauma on the 
field. And in cases where OSHA regulation cannot fully protect players, 
civil litigation still exists as a means to recover damages on the back-
end. 
2. Perverse incentives 
OSHA regulation would be a useful tool to combat the hazard in 
question, especially as the current system is fraught with perverse in-
centives. In a perfectly functioning world, a player who suffers a con-
cussion is removed from the game and does not play in future games 
until any concussive symptoms and injuries suffered have dissipated. 
Whether this system functions as intended depends on various actors, 
all of whom have an incentive not to act in accordance with the stated 
policies. 
First, the player himself: sometimes, a hit to the head may be so 
visible that the referees, the independent medical professional, the 
coaching staff, or others would identify a potential concussive situation 
and remove the player from the field for a medical examination. But 
there also exist situations in which a player suffers a concussion that 
goes unnoticed by observers; in these cases, the player is responsible for 
self-reporting the potential head trauma. 
This situation presents the problem of discounting. A player, be-
lieving he has suffered head trauma, may choose to self-report and re-
move himself from the game. But for the player to do so, he would have 
to value the avoidance of possible long-term consequences of a concus-
sion more than the immediate potential benefits of staying in the game. 
Given that the long-term benefits of self-reporting in this situation are 
intangible, uncertain, and temporally distant from the present, it is 
likely that the player would discount their worth and instead choose to 
stay on the field. Players’ contracts and pay depend on their demon-
strated skill on the field. From the potentially concussed player’s point 
of view, reporting head trauma necessarily results in being taken off 
the field (less play time). If instead the player decides not to report head 
trauma, he has the potential to stay on the field (more play time). If a 
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player weighs the possibility of increased play time now greater than 
the avoidance of potential negative health effects later, then the per-
verse incentive is clear: on the margins, the player will not report po-
tential head trauma. 
Similar perverse incentives exist for the coaching staff. Violation of 
concussion protocol results in fines and forfeited draft picks, which 
likely work to align the coaches’ incentives with the long-term interests 
of the players. The 2016–17 season is the first season that these penal-
ties were to be enforced. Despite this, recently released concussion data 
from the 2016–17 season indicates that the number of reported concus-
sions suffered by players during practice, preseason, and games 
dropped only slightly from the previous season and was on par with the 
average from the past four seasons.183 This indicates that there is still 
work to be done in terms of concussion prevention. 
The system likely works in the most obvious cases of concussions, 
but where there is room for discretion, the coaching staff may choose to 
disregard potential concussive symptoms in order to put the player back 
on the field. The perverse incentives here would be particularly strong 
if a star player in an important game suffered the concussion; it would 
be easy to look toward short-term gain for the team while disregarding 
any potential negative long-term consequences. Even the club medical 
staff has perverse incentives here; while they are to treat the player as 
their patient, to whom they owe a duty of care, it is the member teams 
that pay them. In a borderline case, the scales may tip in favor of the 
medical call preferred by the organization that signs the doctors’ checks. 
OSHA action to change the game so as to reduce the risk of concus-
sions on the front-end would do well to combat the perverse incentives 
entangled in the league policy for dealing with head trauma on the 
back-end. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The idea of government regulation of “America’s sport” is likely to 
produce a visceral reaction. At least one commentator has argued, albeit 
in limited detail, that the perception of OSHA as a political institution 
would work against its involvement in the concussion scandal.184 The 
argument alleges that OSHA, as an executive agency, is “necessarily  
 
 183 Walder, supra note 3. An unknown number of reported concussions suffered in the 2016–
17 season were self-reported. 
 184 See Rodney K. Smith, Solving the Concussion Problem and Saving Professional Football, 35 
T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 127, 171 (2013). 
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politicized” and is subject to oversight by the executive branch and the 
legislative branch.185 This, in combination with the “political volatility 
that would be associated with involving OSHA in regulating the play of 
America’s game,” would make OSHA less likely to act.186 Additionally, 
government regulation of the NFL seems radical. This likely connects 
to the concept of feasibility, as discussed above. American football is an 
institution in this country and it is likely that the public would not take 
to sweeping changes so easily. Should a governmental body choose to 
meddle in professional sports, it is likely that there would be a negative 
reaction from the public. 
But the concussion scandal is a real problem. The NFL Players As-
sociation has not produced a viable solution to the dangers and health 
risks posed by repeated head trauma (and moreover, there is no evi-
dence that they have tried). Monumental litigation has been brought 
against the NFL and resulted in insufficient changes to the rules. 
OSHA involvement may be exactly what is needed to produce effective 
changes to the game. 
Luckily, OSHA has the capacity to work as a collaborative body. 
OSHA offers a variety of programs aimed at working with employers to 
develop and implement solutions.187 Some of these programs involve on-
site consultations and aid in research efforts.188 If carefully imple-
mented, it is likely that OSHA could work with the NFL to discover 
solutions that would produce minimal disruption to the league as a 
business and to football as an entertainment sport, while making 
strides in protecting players from on-field head trauma. The public per-
ception problem might be mitigated if the public were to see OSHA us-
ing these programs in its enforcement efforts to help the NFL solve its 
concussion problem. 
OSHA would do well to enforce its general duty clause against NFL 
teams. As it stands now, the NFL rules of play inadequately protect 
professional football players from football-related head trauma and en-
suing dangers. Due to the perverse incentives inherent in the current 
NFL reporting system, OSHA regulation would serve as a healthy com-
plement to litigation in its attempts to prevent concussions on the front 
end, rather than to care for players who have suffered head trauma on 
the back-end. 
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